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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from an order of Judge John F. 
Wahlquist of the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County 
granting partial, but insufficient, relief as to the place and 
conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees in the Weber 
County Jail facility. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Concerning the place and conditions of confinement 
of pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail facility 
Judge Wahlquist, on December 28, 1978, ordered as follows: 
The Court therefore, makes the following ORDER: 
1. That the Jailers are ordered to supply to the 
Court concerned--whether that be a Circuit Court, 
District Court, or Justice of the Peace--the names 
of all prisoners who are awaiting trial and/or 
sentencing in that court each Tuesday morning. 
After a detainee has been in confinement for thirty 
(30) days, the Court must consider that this prisoner 
has automatically made a motion for release, and 
should bring him into court to discover whether 
there is any possible way at that time to lessen the 
ordeal of his confinement; whether that be a Circuit 
Court, or a District Court or a Justice of the Peace. 
Each individual plaintiff must be ruled on separately 
This will undoubtedly force the Court Administrator's 
Office to give the matter considerable attention, 
and it will undoubtedly result in certain hardships. 
This, in effect, is requiring that the Court Admin-
istrators give more strict allegience to the State 
Statute that requires first priority be given 
to all persons charged with felonies and in confinement, 
etc., and then on down the list of how courts shall 
be scheduled. Those who will suffer are, first, the 
public and the bar that desire to have civil matters 
heard promptly; second, the convicted prisoner 
space will undoubtedly suffer. Once a prisoner is 
convicted, the sentencing judges frequently give 
due consideration to the pretrial time served as 
a mitigating circumstance to shorten the sentence. 
The shortening of this pretrial confinement will 
-1-
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undoubtedly result in some longer sentences, and 
therefore, heavier confinement in the remaining 
portions of the jail. The persons benefited will be 
the not guilty confined persons and prisoners genenl~ 
2. The court invites the County within thirty 
(30) days to propose some improved form of visita-
tion that might be allowed men in pretrial status. 
The court suggests that perhaps the space used for 
sentenced prisoners down on the ninth floor might 
possibly be used by these personnel on the 12th 
floor at a different hour. The Court is not 
ordering what is called "contact visits," but does 
believe that there should be an obligation to im-
prove the visitations to the quality of those 
experienced on the ninth floor. 
3. The Court suggests that the County contact the 
State Welfare Department to see if there is any 
fund or program available that would give a detainee 
who has no toothbrush, etc. , such an i tern. The Court 
believes many detainees will not receive them from 
other detainees. 
4. The attorneys from each side are invited to 
submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law consistent with the above indicated views. The 
Court will compare the two, and sign one, or make 
such modifications as it deems proper. (R.3l-32) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellantasks that Judge Wahlquist's order be re-
versed to the extent that the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to enter appropriate orders requiring the place and 
conditions for confinement of pretrial detainees in the Weber 
County Jail facility be brought into alignment with constitution· 
ally mandated minimum standards for detainment of pretrial in-
dividuals. Further, that the case be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to enter specific orders upgrading the 
place and conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees to 
a level which complies with minimum constitutional requ:.rements. 
-2-
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FACTS 
On October 26, 1978 nine pretrial detaineeJin-
carcerated on the south half of the 12th floor of the Weber County 
Jail facility (hereafter referred to as South-12) filed, in the 
Second Judicial District Court for Weber County, a pro se petition, 
challenging the place and conditions of their confinement in the 
jail facility, seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (R.l) Counsel 
was appointed by the court to represent the detainees (R.7) and 
an Amended Complaint Seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on 
their behalf on November 17, 1978. (R.8-9) A hearing thereon was 
held before Judge Wahlquist on November 30, 1978. (R.21). 
In the interim period between the filing of the pro se 
Complaint by the detainees themselves and the filing of the 
Amended Complaint, two individuals2 were tried or sentenced and 
no longer remained in the pretrial status, while one individual 3 
was added as a named plaintiff. However, by the date of the final 
hearing on November 30, 1978, only appellant, Mark Wickham, re-
mained in a pretrial status.4 On December 28, 1978 Judge 
1steve Clough, Doug A. Lovell, Durwin Mason, 
Dan Cottam, Larry Parks, David c. Stewart, Mark Wickham, 
Duane Johnson and Clarence Holston. 
2David C. Stewart and Duane Johnson 
3sonny Gabaldon 
4In mid-December, 1978, Mark Wickham plead guilty 
to criminal charges and was subsequently sent to the Diagnostic 
Center at St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City for a 90 day 
evaluation before sentencing. 
-3-
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Wahlquist, by written Memorandum Decision, ordered partial 
relief as to the conditions of confinement provided all pretr~) 
detainees. (R.23-33) 
ORIGINAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS 
Appellant, Mark Wickham, was arrested on October 18, 
1978 (R.ll3) on charges of auto theft and robbery (R.ll8) and • 
placed in the Weber County Jail facility. On December 9, 1978, 
he plead guilty to these charges and was subsequently sent to 
St. Mark's Hospital for a 90 day evaluation. He spent 52 days 
on South-12 as a pretrial detainee. Through the November 30, 19 
hearing date, he had spent the entire time on South-12 never 
having been in the fresh air or sunlight. (R.ll5) He was total! 
indigent having no funds at all with which to purchase personal 
hygiene items (R.ll4) or even stamps or pencils to write letters 
to family or friends. (R.ll4, 117-118) To obtain stamps to mail 
the few letters he was able to send, he traded away his food. 
(R.ll5) He had no visitors because his parents could not come 
up to Ogden on Sundays to see him, this being the only day visit 
ation is permitted in the jail. (R.ll4) It is important to 
note that he remained in the jail as a pretrial detainee only 
because he could not afford bail. He was in all other respects 
eligible for bail. (R.ll6). 
Larry Parks, a pretrial detainee at the time of the 
filing of the original pro se petition, had been placed on s~r 
12 on July 16, 1978 on a felony theft charge. (R.ll9,128) He 
remained in the pretrial status until his sentencing on Novem~ 
3, 1978, a period of approximately 108 days. (R.ll9) During t" 
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period of time he,like appellant Mark Wickham, had no money 
in his account at the jail (R.l20) and had to sell his food or 
perform favors for more afluent detainees in order to obtain 
stamps and pencils to write and mail the over 100 letters he 
sent from the jail. (R.l20, 131) (approximately 1 letter per day) 
These letters were not only personal. Some were letters he wrote 
to various courts but was unable to mail until he could barter 
away his food to obtain stamps. (R.l21) 
On several occasions while Larry Parks was on South-12 
in the pretrial status the area was filled to capacity with 16 
individuals. (R.l21) This overcrowding resulted in tension, 
arguments and fights between detainees. (R.l21) Simply to sleep 
during the day one had to lie on the cement floor cushioned only 
with a blanket. (R.l23) During summer months the jail got so hot 
detainees sat around in their underwear and in winter months 
wrapped themselves in blankets simply to keep warm. (R.l23) 
Medical attention was often slow in being provided (R.l24-125) 
and on two occasions all of the pretrial detainees were sprayed 
down for crabs. (R.l26) Like appellant Mark Wickham, Larry Parks 
was never outdoors in the fresh air and sunlight for exercise 
or recreation during his entire pretrial detainment. (R.l26-127) 
He had visitors only once - they were an elderly couple who re-
fused to come back to see him because the visitation system was 
so poor. (R.l27-l28). 
Douglas A. Lovell, arrested on a charge of armed robbery 
(R.l48), was brought to the Weber County Jail facility on August 
4, 1978. (R.l33) By the November 30, 1978 hearing date he had been 
found guilty of armed robbery but remained on South-12 awaiting 
-"-
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sentencing. (R. 134) He was in a pretrial status for over 100 
days. 
Sonny Gabaldon was placed on South-12 on October 19, 
1978 (R.l05) and was sentenced on criminal charges on October 20, 
1978 (R.l09) Even though Section 17-22-5, U.C.A. 19535 prohibits 
sentenced inmates from being locked up with pretrial detainees he 
remained on South-12 through November 30, 1978, a period of 
approximately 41 days. He also had some unique medical problems. 
He had broken his leg very badly 10 months before being placed in 
jail. The cast had been taken off shortly before his incarcerati~ 
and he was advised to exercise and keep moving his leg. Due to 
the total lack of exercise or recreation facilities in the jail 
he was unable to do this. (R.l06) 
Clarence Holston had been arrested and placed on 
South-12 on October 23, 1978 on charges of theft and probation 
violation. (R.l3) By the time of the November 30, 1978 hearing 
he had plead guilty, been sentenced to the Weber County Jail 
facility and transferred to the lOth floor of the jail. He 
remained in a pretrial status for approximately 30 days. 
Durwin Mason, at the time he signed his Affidavit in 
Support of the Amended Complaint, on November 15, 1978 (R.l6) 
had been in a pretrial status on South-12 for over three months. 
He had severe asthma which was aggravated by the stuffy and crowdec 
5Persons committed on criminal process and detained 
for trial, persons convicted and under sentence, and persons 
committed upon civil process, must not be kept or put in the 
same room, nor shall male and female prisoners, except husband 
and wife, be kept or put in the same room. Females shall be 
under the supervision of a suitable matron to be appointed by 
the sheriff. 
-6-
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conditions on South-12. (R.l6) By the November 30, 1978 hearing 
however, he was no longer in the pretrial status having been 
sentenced by the court. 
The remaining individuals who had petitioned the 
court as pretrial detainees were no longer in the Weber County 
Jail facility on November 30, 1978, having been transferred or 
released. 
PLACE AND CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
South-12, the maximum security area of the jail 
facility (R.79), is utilized to incarcerate pretrial detainees 
who are charged with felonies or Class A misdemeaners. (R.79) 
South-12 consists of an isolated area composed of three cells 
and a day room with a small hall area running between the south 
wall of the cells and day room and the outer south wall of the 
building itself. The general configuration of South-12, as 
roughly set out in Exhibit 2 (R.34) is as follows: 
N 
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The two four-man cells each contain 65 square feet of floor spase. 
(16.2 square feet of space per detainee). The eight-man 
cell contains 104 square feet of floor space. (13 square feet of 
space per detainee). And, the day room area contains 195 
square feet of floor space. (12.1 square feet of space per 
detainee) (R. 80) 
There is no interior lighting in either the cell or day 
room areas. (R. 93,94, 98) The only light source is located in the 
hallway outside the cells and day room or, during the day, comes 
through the barred windows in the outer south wall of the building 
itself. On his visual inspection of South-12, Judge Wahlquist 
noted "that on his visit in the middle of the afternoon, he could 
have read with some difficulty in each of the spaces if he had 
turned and made the proper adjustment so the light from the outer 
windows was utilized." (R.25) 
There is no internal ventilation on South-12 with the 
exception of a forced air heater in the southeast corner of the 
area. 
Along the west wall of the day room are two small, 
thickly-glassed windows with a wire mesh underneath through which 
pretrial detainees are permitted visitation each Sunday. (R.84) 
There are no recreation or exercise facilities 
available to anyone in the jail. (R. 83) 
Chief Correctional Officer Robert D. Humphreys ack~owl~ 
that the overall conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees 
are worse than those of sentenced inmates in the jail facility. 
-8-
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(R.85) Sentenced inmates are housed in a dormitory type area, 
can become trustees and can move more freely about the jail. (R.85 
Officer Humphreys also acknowledged under examination that in 
December, 1977, Dr. Paul Ensign, then Weber County Health Director 
had inspected the 11th floor of the jail finding it to be serious~ 
inadequate. (R.99-100) The 11th floor is identical to South-12 
(R.99) A copy of Dr. Ensign's report, admitted into evidence as 
plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (R.34) determined that "the present con-
ditions are completely unhurnan. The conditions are also very 
unhealthy. The S.P.C.A. would not permit such conditions for 
animals." Dr. Ensign's report recommended changes to alleviate 
the overcrowded and stuffy conditions, but Officer Hyrnphreys 
admitted no changes had been made because the jail has insuffi-
cient space. (R.lOl) 
DAILY ROUTINE OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES ON SOUTH-12 
Individuals incarcerated on South-12 as pretrial 
detainees spend their entire day either locked in their cells or 
locked in the day room. (R.82) Approximately 6:30a.m. detainees 
are moved from their cells to the day room (R.Bl) where all 
detainees are locked up together. At approximately 6:30p.m. 
in the evening they are returned to their respective cells. (R.82) 
There is no freedom of movement between cells and the day room 
at any time. The hallway is utilized only to move detainees 
from one place to the other. With the exception of court appear-
ances pretrial detainees never leave South-12 until sentencing 
or release. (R.83) 
-9-
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Pretrial detainees are permitted one telephone call 
per week, on Saturdays. (R.84) They may receive visitors once 
a week on Sundays for approximately 15 minutes. (R.84) No con-
tact visitation is permitted, rather visitation takes place by 
yelling through the glass window and wire mesh on the west wall 
of the day room area. (R.91) 
Meals are served to pretrial detainees in the day room 
(R.86) When South-12 is filled to capacity it is not unusual for 
some detainees to have to sit on the floor of the day room whi:e 
they eat because there are insufficient tables or benches to sit 
on. (R.l22) Eating utensils consist of a plastic spoon and a 
styrofoam cup which are provided each detainee, free of charge, 
twice a week. (R.86) 
The issues which have been raised in this action on 
behalf of pretrial detainees have also been raised in a federal 
class action lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the 
Northern District of Utah. (Case No. NC 78-0015) Judge Aldon 
Anderson, however, on February 20, 1979, upon learning of this 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court entered his order staying any 
fu~ther proceedings in that case until such time as the Utah 
Supreme Court has had this opportunity to fully address the issues 
raised by appellant concerning the place and conditions of con-
finement of pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail facility. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT IN THIS INSTANCE 
EVEN THOUGH HE IS NO LONGER A PRETRIAL DETAINEE 
BEING INCARCERATED IN THE WEBER COUNTY JAIL FACILITY. 
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>.' 
Appellant is no longer a pretrial detainee being held 
on South-12 in the Weber County Jail facility. This fact 
however does not moot an appeal on the merits of this case. 
It has long been recognized and is the rule in an 
overwhelming majority of states that an appeal will not be 
dismissed as moot when to do so would leave unsettled a question 
of great public interest or one affecting the public generally. 
132 A.L.R. 1179; 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, Section 81. Many 
courts have addressed this issue. In Van de Vegt v. Larimer County, 
55 P.2d 703, 710 (Colo. 1936) in a case dealing with the 
power through writ of mandamus to compel the Larimer County 
Board of Commissioners to issue a liquor license the question 
of mootness of the appeal arose. The Colorado Supreme Court 
citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, 219 U.S. 
498, 31 s. Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) held as follows: 
A case is not moot where interests of a public 
character are asserted under conditions that may 
be immediately repeated, merely because the time 
for a particular order has expired. 
In a similar vein it has been held that appeals 
will not be dismissed for mootness where it would be difficult 
or even impossible in any other way to get a final determination 
of the questions involved because the case must necessarily 
become moot before the appeal can be heard. Close v. Southern 
Maryland Agricultural Asso., 108 A. 209 (1919); Doering v. 
Swoboda, 253 N.W. 657 (1934). 
United States Supreme Court decisions offer further 
guidance on this question. The Supreme Court has held in a long 
-11- j 
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line of decisions that an issue otherwise rendered moot through 
the passage of time or other happenstance will not be dismissed 
as moot where to do so would allow the continuation of a con-
dition "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113,125, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) 
citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co., v. ICC, supra; 
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814,816, 23 L.Ed.2d 1, 89 S. Ct. 1493 
(1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179, 21 
L.Ed. 2d 325, 89 S. Ct. 347 (1968); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 
345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 97 L.Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953). 
The place and conditions of confinement of pretrial 
detainees in the Weber County Jail facility and the propriety 
of appellant's appeal on the merits in this instance falls 
squarely under the exception to the mootness dismissal doctrine. 
Further, the trial court has entered its general order affecting 
the place and conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees. 
Judicial review by the courts of this state of the conditions of 
confinement of pretrial detainees in the jail facility is primarily 
a state question and is not only a question of great public 
interest affecting the public generally but is also precisely the 
type of situation where the unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement are continuing and ongoing yet evade review due to 
the relative brevity of time an individual remains in the pretrial 
detainee status as compared against the length of time necessary 
to pursue a trial and appeal on the merits. Falling squarely 
within the rule outlined in the cases above, appellant's appeal 
is not subject to being dismissed as moot. 
-12-
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POINT II 
THE WEBER COUNTY JAIL FACILITY AS A PLACE OF 
DETAINMENT FOR PRETRIAL DETAINEES IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONALLY OVERCROWDED. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN NOT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES 
TO A LEVEL WHICH COMPORTS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS. 
In the Amended Complaint seeking Writ of Habeas Corpus 
appellant had alleged that his Eighth Amendment federal consti-
tutional right 6 against cruel and unusual punishment had been 
violated by his incarceration as a pretrial detainee on South-12 
and further that his state constitutional right to imprisonment 
without unnecessary rigor under Article I, Section 97 of the 
Constitution of Utah had been violated. (R.8) While Judge 
Wahlquist did not order the immediate transfer or release of the 
appeallant or other pretrial detainees from the jail facility, 
he did make some remedial orders concerning the place and conditions 
of confinement of pretrial detainees. This is entirely proper 
under a complaint seeking writ of habeas corpus. In Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,238-239, 20 L.Ed.2d 554, 88 S. Ct. 1556 
the Supreme Court Stated: 
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that 
the applicant must be "in custody" when the 
application for habeas corpus is filed. This 
is required not only by the repeated references 
6Eighth Amendment. Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
?Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments 
be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
-13-
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in the statute, but also by the history of the 
great writ. Its province, shaped to guarantee 
the most fundamental of all rights, is to provide 
an effective and speedy instrument by which 
judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of 
the detention of a person. See Peyton v. Rowe, 
319 U.S. 54, 20 L.Ed. 2d 426, 88 S. Ct. 1549. 
But the statute does not limit the relief that 
may be granted to discharge of the applicant from 
physical custody. Its mandate is broad with re-
spect to the relief that may be granted. It 
provides that "the court shall ..• dispose of the 
matter as law and justice require." 28 USC §2243 
The 1966 amendments to the habeas corpus statute 
seem specifically to contemplate the possibility 
of relief other than immediate release from phys-
ical custody. At one point, the new §2244 (b) 
(1964 ed. , Supp. ii) speaks in terms of "release 
from custody or other remedy." See Peyton v. Rowe, 
supra; Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 19L-.---
Ed. 2d 1215, 88 S. Ct. 962 (1968). Cf. Ex Parte Hull, 
312 U.S. 546, 85 L.Ed. 1034, 61 S. Ct. 640 (1941). 8 
However, it is equally true that a trial court commits reversible 
error and abuses its discretion in failing to exercise its power 
when its exercise ~s warranted by the facts before the court. 
Strzebinska v. Jary, 193 A. 747; 112 A.L.R. 391; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Appeal and Error, Section 773. 
Recognizing that the conditions of confinement of 
pretrial detainees in the Weber County Jail "would be considered 
as constitutionally cruel and inhumane if the detainees were so 
held for a long period" (R.61) and further that "Federal 
decisions in this area have established as the minimally 
acceptable standard 50 square feet of space per sentenced 
prisoner in order to comply with constitutional prohibitions 
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Weber County Jail 
8citing also 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 
Article 39 of the Magna Carta 108-125 (1926) 
-14-
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is inadequate in this respect and therefore severely overcrowded." 
(R.61) the trial court erred in failing to enter its order re-
quiring defendant to comply with minimum constitutional require-
ments of space for the detainment of pretrial individuals. 
Constitutional standards of confinement for pretrial 
detainees are particularly strict because the pretrial detainee 
retains all rights of ordinary citizens except those necessary 
to assure his appearance for trial. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 
1,4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. 
Supp.873, 897 (W.O. Mo. 1977): Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 
594, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). As a pretrial detainee, appellant 
then enjoys all constitutional rights of a defendant on bail 
awaiting trial, and any curtailment of those rights must be 
justified to the extent such denial is required to insure that 
he appears at trial. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 
137-138 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, 897. 
Pretrial detainees do not stand on the same footing as convicted 
inmates. Therefore, the conditions for detention must not only 
be equal to but superior to those permitted for prisoners 
serving sentences for the crimes that they have committed against 
society. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. 
Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd. 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 
1974); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971) 
Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1971); 
Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, at 898. Incarceration of pretrial 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
detainees on South-12 in what are the maximum security cells of 
the Weber County Jail, when not necessary, violates the detainees 
rights to due process, to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, to be imprisoned without unnecessary rigor, and 
violates their right to equal protection of the laws by unnec-
essarily treating them more harshly than those convicted. 
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 459, 552 (E.D. La. 1972); 
Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, at 624; Brenneman v. Madigan, supra, 
at 131; Hamilton v. Love, supra, at 1182; Jones v. Wittenburg, 
supra,at 898. 
It was the direct testimony of Chief Correctional 
Officer Robert Humphreys at the November 30, 1978 trial that 
pretrial detainees are treated in all respects exactly the same 
as if they were already convicted inmates serving sentences in 
the jail facility. (R.85) Indeed, Officer Humphreys testified 
that all pretrial detainees whether on South-12 or elsewhere in 
the jail are housed under the most harsh and restrictive conditions 
in the jail facility. (R.85). This arrangement is completely 
contrary to the clear and established law regarding the con-
finement of pretrial detainees and, in and of itself, established 
a prima facie constitutional violation which the trial court 
erred in failing to address and order corrected. 
In conjunction with the independent constitutional 
violation set out above, the clear and undisputed testimony at 
trial also established that even under the most restrictive 
standards of space requirements for sentenced individuals,South-
12, as the detention area for pretrial detainees, is unconsti-
-16-
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tutionally overcrowded. The trial court erred in failing 
to enter its order limiting the number of pretrial detainees 
which may be incarcerated on South-12 to a number which would comport 
with minimal constitutional standards. 
Testimony at trial established that pretrial detainees 
are at all times locked up in either a four man cell containing 
65 square feet of space (16.2 square feet of space per detainee); 
an eight man cell containing 104 square feet of space (13 square 
feet of space per detainee); or in a sixteen man capacity day 
room containing 195 square feet of space. (12.1 square feet of 
space per detainee) (R.80-81) 
Numerous courts have specifically addressed the issue 
of adequate space for pretrial detainees so as not to run afoul 
of constitutional requirements. In Detainees of the Brooklyn 
House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 398-399 
(2nd Cir. 1975) a case where two pretrial detainees were being 
placed in cells of approximately 40 square feet in size (20 
square feet per detainee and substantially more than that afforded 
detainees in any area of the Weber County Jail facility) the 
court stated: 
... What we are faced with here is whether 
double celling in a cell 5 x 8 feet, 40 square 
feet of floor space, creates such dehumanizing 
conditions as to deprive the detainees of their 
constitutional rights of due process and equal 
protection ... 
As we have noted, double celling has been 
disapproved by various correctional associations 
and numerous experts on prison reform. It has 
been specifically condemned by lower courts in 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 
supra, (cell 8 x 11 feet); Tyler v. Percick, 
-17-
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Civil Action No. 74-40C (2) (E.D. Mo., Filed 
October 15, 1974) (cell 8 x 5 feet) , and also 
by state courts in Wayne County Jail Inmates v. 
Wane Count Board of Commissioners, Civil Action 
No. 173217 Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich. July 28, 
1972 and May 25, 1971), aff'd and remanded, 391 
Mich. 359, 216 N.W. 2d 910 (1974) (cell 6 x 7 
feet); Commonwealth ex. re. Brfant v. Hendrick, 
444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971 • Overcrowding 
alone in pretrial detention facilities above 
rated capacities has been held to create a 
restrictive and deplorable living environment 
constituting an intolerable violation of the 
detainees' constitutional rights. Taylor v. 
Sterrett, 344, F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. l972); 
Ham1lton v. Love, supra; Jones v. Wittenburg, 
323 F. Supp. 93 and 330 F. Supp. 707, 714, 
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 
854 (6th Cir. 1972); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 
F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970) •.. 
We affirm upon the findings of facts and 
conclusions of law of the district court that 
the overcrowding and double celling of detainees 
at the two institutions create an unconstitutional 
deprivation of their due process and equal pro-
tection rights. Brooklyn v. Malcolm, at 398, 399. 
Similar results have been reached in other decisions. 
Jones v. Wittenburg, supra, found double celling in 6 x 9 
cells to be overcrowded and unconstitutional. That case dealt 
with the conditions of the Lucas County Jail, in Toledo, Ohio. 
Ambrose v. Malcolm, 414 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
recognized the American Correctional Association standard of 
75 square feet per inmate as being the minimally acceptable 
square footage requirements for pretrial detainees. In Ambrose 
the court entered its order that no more than 29 individuals 
be detained in the facility in question rather than the 40 to 
60 individuals who had previously been detained in the facility. 
The 29 detainee capacity was the maximum number of individuals 
allowable under the 75 square feet per detainee standard. If 
such a standard were applied to the Weber County Jail facility, 
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pretrial detainee maximum capacity on South-12 would be three 
pretrial detainees. Even assuming a lesser standard of SO 
square feet per sentenced inmate were utilized (this coming from 
Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976) which has 
been the minimally acceptable reported standard for sentenced 
inmates, the maximum pretrial detainee capacity of each side 
of the 12th floor of the Weber County Jail would be ! pre-
trial detainees. 
In Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 
1976) the court examined a facility housing both pretrial 
detainees and sentenced inmates. The court adopted a 70 
square feet per inmate standard and found the facility to 
be constitutionally lacking. In Rodriquez, at 587 examples 
were given of cell areas found to be deficient. It should be 
noted that the following examples are more spacious that the 
Weber County Jail facility. 
GALLERY NO. AREA SQUARE FEET NO. OF INMATES AREA PER INMATE 
SQUARE FEET 
1 234.7 13 18 
II 237.6 12 19.8 
III 234.7 10 23.5 
Upon issuing its interim order, before closure of the facility, 
the court ruled that no more than 4 individuals could be 
locked up in each of the above three galleries in accordance 
with its findings of a 70 square feet per inmate requirement. 
Separate and apart from the above cited cases, 
dealing primarily or exclusively with pretrial detainees a 
multitude of other decisions have addressed space requirements 
for the constitutional confinement of sentenced inmates. 
Please ke~p in mind that it has previously been decided and 
-lQ_ 
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is now settled law that pretrial detainees must be housed 
and treated in conditions of confinement which are not only 
equal to but superior to those of sentenced individuals. 
(Citations omitted - see page 15 of this Brief). 
Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp. 732, (W.O. Miss. 1976) 
is representative of decisions from throughout the country and 
establishes the lowest figure for space per inmate in a prison 
or jail which has been found acceptable. Gates states that 50 
square feet per inmate is the minimally acceptable square 
footage required to comport with the constitutional prohibition 
in the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. 
In Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 
1976), the court held 63 square feet per two inmates to be 
unconstitutional. I~ s= holding, the district court referred 
to several sources which have set minimum square footage 
requirements for the sleeping space of inmates in prisons or 
jails. The court in Chapman stated: 
The American Correctional Institution has concluded 
that 75 square feet is the minimally acceptable 
standard. 
The National Sheriff's Assn. Handbook on Jail 
Architecture (1975) asserts that single occupancy 
detention rooms should average 70-80 square feet 
(at pg. 62). 
The National Sheriff's Assn. Manual on Jail 
Administration (1970) suggests that in multiple 
celling 55 square feet of space per occupant is 
minimal. 
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners 
(1972) concludes that no less than fifty square 
feet of floor space in any confined sleeping areas 
should be provided as minimal. 
-20-
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The Report of the Special Civilian Committee 
for the study of the United States Army Confinement 
system (1970) indicates that the Army standard 
in 1969 was 55 square feet and the Army, not known 
for coddling, adheres to that. 
Other federal district courts across the country have 
reached similar results. Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 
1105 (D. Del. 1977) found 60 square feet per inmate to be the 
minimum. Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.O. Mo. 1977) 
found double celling in cells of 75-77 square feet to be 
unconstitutional. At the circuit court level, the 50 square 
foot standard per inmate was approved in Newman v. State of 
Alabama, 559 F. 2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a 60 square foot per inmate standard used by the United 
States District Court for Oklahoma in Battle v. Anderson, 564 
F.2d 388 (lOth Cir. 1977). See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 
318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) requiring 60 sq. ft.; and Martinez v. 
Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976) requiring not less than 
10 x 7 square feet. 
The square footage afforded pretrial detainees in the 
Weber County Jail facility is far below the minimum constituional 
square footage requirements set out above for either pretrial 
detainees or even for sentenced inmates. The trial court found 
that there is an average number of nine pretrial detainees 
locked up on South-12 on a daily basis (R.54) although it is 
undisputed that there are on occasion 16 individuals on South-12 
in a pretrial status (R.l21,137) As pointed out previously 
however, even this average daily pretrial population far exceeds 
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any constitutionally permissible level. The entire jail facility, 
originally designed to hold only 52 men, has a total cell area squay. 
footage capacity in the mens cell areas of 1427 l/2 square feet 
(R.l02) for both pretrial and sentenced individuals. If filled 
to capacity (presently 112 beds) (R.l02) this would yield 
approximately 12.7 square feet of space per individual in the 
entire jail. Under the minimum acceptable standards found by 
the courts as exemplified by Gates v. Collier, supra, which 
established a 50 square feet per inmate minimum standard, the 
maximum capacity of the jail facility at any given point in time, 
under constitutional standards, would be 28 individuals. Yet, 
the jail facility on the November 30, 1978 hearing date had 89 
individuals in the jail. (R.lOl) of which, Chief Correctional 
Officer Humphreys estimated that on a daily basis 40 per cent 
would be pretrial detainees. (R.lOl) 
According to the unanimous weight of authority, the severe! 
overcrowded Weber County Jail facility violates the constiutional 
rights of appellant and all other pretrial detainees in that the 
conditions of their crowded confinement amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment; violates their right to due process; 
violates their right to equal protection; violates their right 
against cruel and unusual punishment and violates their right 
to imprisonment without unnecessary rigor. That overcrowding 
of jails violates an inmate's constitutional rights and adversely 
affects society was recognized by the New York State Court in 
Cooper v. Morin, 398 N.Y.S. 2d 36 (1977). The court stated in 
that case: 
-22-
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Overcrowding of prisons or local detention 
facilities violates the due process and equal 
protection rights of the inmates therein. De-
tainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men 
v. Malcom, (2nd Cir.) 520 F.2d 392, 399, 
Costello v. Wainwright, (M.D. Fla.) 397 F.Supp. 
20 aff'd (5th Cir.) 525 F. 2d 1239, vac., 539 
F.2d 547, revd., 430 u.s. 325, 97 s.ct. 1191 
51 L.Ed.2d 372 (1977) . 
... correctional institutions must be more than 
mere depositories for human baggage ... (Detainees 
etc., supra, at 397) A free democratic society 
cannot cage inmates like animals in a zoo or 
stack them like chattels in a warehouse and expect 
them to emerge as decent, law abiding, contributing 
members of the community. In the end, society 
becomes the loser. Costello, supra, at 38. 
The sole justification for the conditions of con-
finement found in the Weber County Jail is that there is no where 
else to put pretrial detainees and no money to construct better 
facilities . However, the rationale provides no justification 
whatsoever. 
We restate settled principles of federal 
jurisprudence, i.e.; that constitutional treat-
ment of human beings confined to penal institutions 
is not dependent upon the willingness or the financial 
ability of the State to provide decent penitentiaries. 
Gate v. Collier, supra,at 742. 
The conditions under which pretrial detainees are 
incarcerated in the Weber County Jail clearly and unquestionably 
violates settled principles of constitutional law. The only 
justification relied upon by the trial court in not finding the 
conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees unconditionally 
unconstitutional was that pretrial detainees were not held under 
such conditions for longer periods of time. (R.61) This con-
elusions however, is not supported by the evidence nor does it 
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provide a justification regardless of the length or brevity of 
time a pretrial detainee might be subjected to such conditions. 
Chief Correctional Officer Humphreys acknowledged under 
examination that the average length of time a pretrial 
individual might await trial on Southl2 was approximately 
30 days up to as many as 90 days. (R.83) The undisputed 
testimony of appellant was that he had been in a pretrial 
status for approximately 52 days (R.ll8); Larry Parks had been 
a pretrial detainee for 108 days (R.ll9); Douglas A. Lovell 
had been in a pretrial status for over 100 days (R.l34); Sonny 
Gabaldon had been on South-12 for 41 days (R.l05); Clarence 
Holston was in pretrial detainment for approximately 30 days (R.ll 
and Durwin Mason had been on South-12 for over 90 days. (R.l6). 
Such clear violations of constitutional standards do not 
permit such a justification to stand. Pretrial detainees may not 
be subjected to conditions amounting to punishment until after 
they have been found guilty of a criminal offense. It must be 
remembered that: 
Pretrial detainees are no more than defendants 
waiting for trial, entitled to the presumption 
of innocence, a speedy trial and all the rights 
of bailees and otherordinary citizens except those 
necessary to assure their presence at trial and 
the security of the prison. Brooklyn House of 
Detention for men v. Malcolm, supra, at 397 citing 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. ~89 S.Ct. 1322, 
22 L.Ed 2d 600 (1969); Tate v. Short, 401 u.s. 
395, 91 s.ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 13o-TI971); Williams 
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed. 
2d 586 (1970); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 
81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d. 231 (1960); Collins v. 
Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D.Md.l972); Seale v. 
Manson, 326 F.Supp. 1375 (D.Conn. 1971); Davis v. 
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Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 
see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions 
of Pretrial Detainees, 79 Yale L.J. 941 {1970) 
As the trial court in Jones v. Wittenburg, supra, at 
100 pointed out if constitutional rights of pretrial detainees are 
being violated they are entitled to immediate relief at the hands 
of the court. In this case however, no relief has been provided onl 
justification and excuse. The trial court erred in failing to 
exercise its power by immediately ordering the reduction of the 
pretrial population to a level in accord with constitutional 
requirements or at the least establish a clear and definite 
timetable by which the population level of pretrial detainees 
incarcerated on South-12 would be reduced to an acceptable level 
with the prohibition that the number of pretrial detainees on 
South-12 not exceed constitutional levels in the future. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THAT 
REGULAR CONTACT VISITATION MUST BE PROVIDED TO 
PRETRIAL DETAINEES. 
The trial court erred in failing to order that contact 
visitation must be provided to pretrial detainees on a regular 
basis. The testimony was undisputed and indeed the trial court 
found that no contact visitation of any sort was permitted 
pretrial detainees. (R.57,62) The trial court in his conclusions 
of law specifically stated(R.61-62): 
Further, the visitation facilities and practices 
utilized in the jail do not comply with current 
law in reference to pretrial detainees in that 
the visitation and practices as presently permitted 
in the jail do not allow for contact visitation 
between pretrial detainees and friends or family; 
and, additionally, the frequency of visitations 
permitted to pretrial detainees are inadequate. 
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With this specific conclusion however, the trial court merely 
ordered that defendant submit a plan for improved visitation but 
declined to order contact visitation. (R.67) 
In Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
aff'd 527 F.2d 1041 (2nd Cir. 1975) the court held that pretrial 
detainees in the Manhattan House of Detention had a constitutional 
right to contact visitation. This decision has remained the law 
ever since and is now a settled principle of constitutional law 
to which pretrial detainees are universally entitled. In Rhem 
the type of visitation found to be deficient was an arrangement 
whereby pretrial detainees were allowed visitors twice a week 
for 30 minutes at each session. Detainees sat in booths 
and communicated with visitors by telephone while looking through 
a bullet proof glass window. Even this arrangement, found uncon-
stitutional by the court, was substantially better than the 
visitation system outlined by Judge Wahlquist in paragraph 13 
of his findings of fact. (R.57) 
Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977) reached 
an identical conclusion in examining the Duval County Jail in 
Jacksonvill~ Florida, a facility with many similarities to the 
facilities and practices found in the Weber County Jail. At the 
Duval County Jail, inmates were forced to yell, three at a time, 
through windows in each cellblock. This arrangement prevented 
any privacy or physical contact whatsoever. A plan for contact 
visitation was ordered submitted to the court. Any restrictions 
on contact visitation were then required to be on institutional 
-26-
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security rather than institutional convenience. The only basis 
upon which contact visitation may be denied any particular 
pretrial detainee is based upon the individual detainee being 
classified a peculiar security risk. A blanket denial of contact 
visitation to pretrial detainees is constitutionally impermissible. 
In Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 
supra, at 835 the court stated: 
This court is not unaware of the City's concern 
with the security of its institution and the 
possible effect contact visits may have on this 
legitimate concern. However, the possibility of 
a classification system to determine which inmates 
are security risks and thus should not participate 
in contact visits has been upheld. Rhem v. Malcolm, 
supra,507 F.2d at 338. 
Moreover, the fiscal difficulties of New York 
City cannot absolve the defendants of their 
constitutional obligations. This argument has 
been dismissed repeatedly by the Court of Appeals 
in this Circuit, reminding us that "an individual's 
constitutional rights may not be sacrified on 
the ground that the city has other and more pressing 
priorities •.. Denial of the presumptively innocent 
detainee's constitutional rights prepresents an 
impermissible price to pay for this retention in 
custody. 
The same decision has been reached in Ahrens v. 
Thomas, supra; O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., supra; and 
Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 651 (W.D.Ky. 1976). 
Most recently in Marcera v. Chinlund, 47 Law Week 
2562 (2nd Cir. 2/27/79) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
definitively stated: 
The right of pretrial detainees to regular 
contact visits is grbunded on the bedrock of 
our criminal juisprudence : an individual 
accused of a crime is presumed innocent, and 
may not be punished, until a jury finds him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus pretrial detainees 
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may be subjected only to those restraints on their 
liberty that inhere in the confinement itself or 
are clearly justified by the "compelling necessities 
of jail administration." These necessities do not 
include cost or mere administrative inconvenience. 
While reasonable classification schemes designed 
to weed out those detainees who would present in-
tolerable security risks if granted contact visits 
are permissible, blanket prohibitions are banned. 
In sum, it is too late in the day to suggest that 
it does not offend the Constitution not to permit 
pretrial detainees contact visits ••. (emphasis added) 
The Marcera court went on to hold that it was an 
abuse of the trial judge's discretion not to have awarded the 
plaintiffs in that case interim relief and ordered that the 
respective defendants immediately formulate and submit to the 
trial court plans for implementing contact visits within a perioo 
of one year. 
By failing to order contact visitation either commencing 
immediately or within a reasonable time for pretrial detainees whc 
are not exceptional security risks the trial court in this 
matter committed error to the extent that pretrial detainees, 
entitled to contact visitation as a matter of right, have been 
denied the same. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROHIBIT THE 
INCARCERATION OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES IN THE WEBER 
COUNTY JAIL FACILITY DUE TO THE TOTAL LACK OF EXERCISE 
OR RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OR ALTERNATIVELY TO 
ENTER ITS ORDER THAT REMEDIAL STEPS BE TAKEN TO 
PROVIDE ADEQUATE EXERCISE AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES 
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. 
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Testimony at trial in this matter was undisputed 
that there are no exercise or recreational facilities or 
opportunities available to pretrial detainees in the Weber County 
Jail facility. (R.83) The trial court noted in paragraph 16 of 
his findings of fact (R.59) that "There is no access to an 
ordinary exercise space, fresh air or sunlight •.. Detainees in 
general have no exercise except that incidental to stretching, 
leaning on walls, and walking around one or two steps at a time." 
In his conclusions of law the trial court concluded as follows 
(R.6l): 
In addition, federal decisions, as applied to 
states through the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, have clearly established 
that pretrial detainees as well as sentenced pri-
soners have an absolute right to outdoor exercise, 
recreation, fresh air and sunlight. None of these 
opportunities are available to detainees or sentenced 
individuals incarcerated in the Weber County Jail 
and the 'ail is constitutional! defective in this 
respect. emphasis a 
Having determined that the Weber County Jail facility is 
constitutionally defective in these respects it constitutes error 
for the trial court not to act to remedy the constitutional defects. 
As Judge Wahlquist recognized pretrial detainees 
have an absolute right to outdoor exercise, recreation, fresh 
air and sunlight. Ahrens v. Thomas, supra, is squarely on 
point. That case dealt with conditions of confinement of pre-
trial detainees in the Platte County Jail in Missouri. In Ahrens 
pretrial detainees were confined to tank areas without access to 
any areas outside the tank for recreation or exercise purposes. 
The court ruled as follows: 
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The total lack of recreation and exercise 
facilities and programs at the Platte County Jail 
violates due process. Brenneman v. Madigan, 
supra, at 140; Jones v. Wittenburg, 330 F. Supp. 
at 717; Hamilto~Landrieu, supra; Taylor v. 
Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 422 (N.D.Tex. 1972), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Love, supra, at 1193. 
Confinement in the Platte County Jail without 
an opportunity for regular outdoor exercise consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 
F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D. La. 1971). 
In Rhem v. Malcolm, supra, the court held that the 
right of pretrial detainees to reasonable physical exercise is 
fundamental. In Rhem, even before the court examined the 
exercise program, the detainees had some exercise available to 
them. Each detainee was permitted a 50 minute exercise period 
once a week on a small, outdoor rooftop area of the facility. 
For pretrial detainees this was found to be constitutionally 
inadequate. 
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D.N.H. 1976) 
examined the exercise program for convicted inmates in pro-
tective custody at the New Hampshire State Prison. There inmates 
had some indoor and some outdoor exercise. The court, however, 
found the program so limited as to endanger the prisoner's 
health and therefore concluded that the restraint on the inmates 
right to exercise constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1131, 
(E.D. La. 1971) held as follows: 
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... confinement for long periods of time without 
the opportunity for regular outdoor exercise does, 
as a matter of law, constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
The same result was reached in Miller v. Carson, 
supra, which held that state prisoners through the 14th Amendment 
have an absolute right to outdoor exercise. 
In accord with these decisions see also Smith v. 
Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. Janing, 427 
F. Supp. 567 (1976): O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich.; 437 
F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1977): and Wright v. Raines, 571 P.2d 
26 (Ct. of App., Kan. 1977). 
Once again, there is no justification in the difficulty 
in providing space for exercise and recreation. Rhem v. 
Malcolm, supra, at 627 spoke directly to this point. 
The difficulty of providing space for exercise 
in an urban institution is unacceptable as justifi-
cation for the deprivation imposed on MHD inmates .•• 
Where necessary, courts have required structural 
alterations to provide the required space, see, 
e.g., Hamilton v. Love, supra, 328 F. Supp. at 
1193 and decree of June ~971 Par. 70; Wayne 
County Inmates v. Wayne County Board of CommiSSioners, 
Civil No. 173217 Cir. Court, Wayne County, 
Michigan, July 28, 1972, at 25-6, and have ordered 
that particular periods of exercise be made avail-
able, Hamilton v. Landrieu, supra, 351 F. 
Supp. at 550, or that outdoor exercise areas be 
created, Taylor v. Sterrett, supra, 344 F. Supp. 
at 422. See also, Holland v. Donelon, Civil No. 
71-1442 (E.D. La. June 6, 1973) at 12 and cases 
cited, Brenneman v. Madigan, supra, 343 F. 
Supp. at 135, 140; Conklin v.-aancock, supra, 
334 F. Supp. at 1122 and Jones v. Wittenburg, 
supra, 330 F. Supp. at 717. 
-31-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In circumstances where, as in the Weber County Jail, 
there are no exercise or recreation facilities of any kind; and, 
the conditions are so bad as to cause the physical and mental 
deterioration of pretrial detainees 9 (see plaintiff's exhibit 1) 
(R.34) the failure of the trial court to prohibit the confine-
rnent of pretrial detainees under such condition or at the least 
to enter its order requiring the correction of these conditions 
within a reasonable time in an abuse of discretion which must 
be corrected on appeal. 
POINT V 
THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING INDIGENT DETAINEES 
TO PURCHASE THEIR OWN STAMPS FOR THE MAILING OF 
LETTERS VIOLATES BOUNDS V. SMITH, 430 U.S. 
817, 52 L.Ed. 2d 72 S. Ct. 1491 (1977) 
The uncontroverted testimony at trial herein revealed 
that it is not uncommon for some pretrial detainees to be indigent 
having no money in an account with the jail. (R.96,114,115,117, 
118,120,121) Indeed the testimony of Larry Parks revealed that 
he had even written some letters to courts but was unable to send 
them because he had no money with which to purchase stamps. 
(R.l20-121) The primary way appellant Mark Wickham and witness 
9 
Dr. Ensign stated: 
They spend all day in this room and the night in bunk 
rooms with similar conditions while awaiting trial. 
What does an inmate do under such conditions? Just 
what you or I would do - deteriorate phsyically and 
mentally, be exposed to and have our resistance to 
disease lowered, think of ways to get out, find things 
to complain about, become very depressed, maybe even 
think of ways to get even. It doesn't take much skill 
to see that this is a very unhealthy situatio~. 
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Larry Parks obtained stamps was to trade away their food to more 
affluent detainees. (R.l20) 
The practice of requiring all detainees, including 
indigent detainees, to purchase stamps for mailing letters and 
pencils to write them with violates the detainees right of access 
to the courts and is a direct violation of Bounds v. Smith, supra. 
In Bounds, at 824 Justice Marshall writing the majority opinion 
of the court stated: 
Moreover, our d~cisions have consistently 
required States to shoulder affirmative 
obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful 
access to the courts. It is indisputable that 
indigent inmates must be provided at state ex-
pense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, 
with notarial services to authenticate them, and 
with stamps to mail them. 
It was an abuse of the trial court's power to fail to correct 
this constitutional violation. Appellant asks that this matter be 
remanded to the trial court for entry of an appropriate order. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
PROHIBIT THE INCARCERATION OF SENTENCED 
INDIVIDUALS WITH PRETRIAL DETAINEES AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 17-22-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
Section 17-22-5 provides that sentenced individuals 
may not be kept or put in the same room as pretrial detainees. 
Testimony at trial in this case revealed that witness Sonny 
Gabaldon had been locked up in the same room with appellant, 
after having been sentenced, for a period of approximately 
40 days. (R.l09) This was in direct violation of the state 
statute and further, infringed upon appellant's right to 
confinement without unnecessary rigor as a pretrial detainee in the 
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Weber County Jail facility. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
order defendant's strict compliance with Section 17-22-5. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence presented at trial in this matter and the 
case law which supports that evidence is largely undisputed. The 
defendant's position throughout this action has been to generally 
agree that the Weber County Jail facility is substandard but not 
really so bad as to require the imposition of a judicial remedy 
to the situation. The error with this position however, is that 
for pretrial detainees the poor physical conditions, the severe 
overcrowding and related problems of the facility surpass consti-
tutionally permissible levels and enter the realm of unconstitutio: 
and prohibited activities and conditions. When proper facts are 
presented to the court, as in this instance, requiring judicial 
intervention, it is as much error for the trial court to fail to 
exercise its power as for a trial court to act in excess of its 
power. 
In this case proper facts, requiring the exercise of its 
power, were presented to the trial court which in turn failed to 
order the necessary relief mandated by the settled constitutional 
law in this area. This failure to act, on the part of the court, 
is subject to reversal with a remand of the case to being made 
to the trial court with instructions to enter appropriate orders 
bringing the Weber County Jail facility up to a constitutional 
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par. Appellant respectfully asks that the Utah Supreme Court 
enter its decision 
DATED this 
accordingly. 
/tdday of f.J , 1979. 
UTAH EGAL SERVICES, INC. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief to Robert Hansen, 
Attorney General at State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and two copies to Robert Newey, Weber County Attorney at 
the Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah 84401, via first class 
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